We analyze a sample of dual and single class initial public offerings (IPOs) to investigate whether empirical estimates of underpricing determinants are consistent across alternative measures of firm size and alternative techniques intended to account for underwriter price stabilization efforts. We find that results from long-standing methods for estimating underpricing relations are generally robust to one's choice of size proxy and are consistent with estimates obtained from censored regressions of first-day returns and from least squares regressions of longer horizon initial returns. We also confirm an existing finding in the literature that dual class IPOs endure less underpricing than do single class firms.
Introduction
, Mello and Parsons (1998) and Stoughton and Zechner (1998) develop models in which corporate control considerations lead to an optimal sale of the firm in stages. All three papers model the benefits captured by passive shareholders when a large shareholder monitors management. Brennan and Franks (1997) also examine the connection between going public and ownership structure, but their approach differs sharply from the three papers mentioned above. In their model, insiders value independence and therefore want to limit the influence of large blockholders after the initial public offerings (IPO). To this end, firms underprice new issues to generate excess demand, which then permits discriminatory rationing against large bidders. Smart and Zutter (2003) argue that a comparison of dual and single class IPOs offers insights into the control motivation for underpricing. Smart and Zutter (2003) argue that because dual class equity effectively entrenches managers, the control motivation for underpricing is absent in these firms. Holding all else equal, lower underpricing for duals is consistent with Brennan and Franks's (1997) hypothesis. Smart and Zutter (2003) report that dual class IPOs experience approximately three percentage points less underpricing than do their single class peers. Arugaslan, Cook, and Kieschnick (2004) question Smart and Zutter's (2003) finding of lower dual class underpricing for two reasons. First, Arugaslan, Cook, and Kieschnick (2004) argue that researchers should use sales as a size-related proxy for asymmetric information rather than the more commonly employed offer proceeds variable. Second, Arugaslan, Cook, and Kieschnick (2004) propose that any link between dual class equity and underpricing should be estimated using a mixed distribution approach rather than conventional cross-sectional regressions, given the potential for underwriter price stabilization efforts to affect the underpricing distribution. Figure 1 illustrates the problem; first-day returns exhibit an unusually large mass at zero and relatively few observations just below zero. Asquith, Jones, and Kieschnick (1998) and Arugaslan, Cook, and Kieschnick (2004) fit a maximum likelihood model that assumes the empirical initial return distribution results from a mixture of two normal distributions. By sampling from each of these distributions it is possible to construct an empirical distribution that closely resembles the distribution in Figure 1 . If the mixed distribution approach provides a superior method for analyzing the cross section of IPO returns, and if results obtained from this model differ from those obtained through conventional cross-sectional regressions, then IPO underpricing relations established in the literature are suspect.
Several recent papers establish that IPO underwriters trade in the secondary market after the initial share distribution, and that these trades can indeed influence the observed return distribution. 1 To the extent that price support affects observed Histogram of first-day returns for 2,622 IPOs from 1990 to 1998 initial returns, researchers have several alternatives for confronting that problem. One option is to estimate a model that explicitly assumes that the empirical underpricing distribution results from a mixture of two or more underlying distributions. In that case, one can interpret the model's estimates as being conditional on price support.
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A second option is to estimate the unconditional relations between initial returns and price support that would be observed in the absence of price support. In this paper, we take the latter approach because most underpricing theories offer predictions about initial returns without conditioning on price support. In other words, to test these theories, researchers need to know how exogenous variables influence underpricing in the absence of underwriter stabilization.
We employ two approaches to obtain unconditional estimates when price support obscures the true underlying initial return distribution. The first method assumes that price support effectively censors the true return distribution. IPO initial returns are not censored in the strict sense that returns below some level (for example, returns below zero) are completely unobservable, but they can be censored in the sense that an IPO with an observable low first-day return would have an even lower initial return in the absence of price support. In other words, though we can observe an initial return for every IPO, for some deals the observable return does not reflect the true return where the true return is defined as the return that would occur without underwriter intervention.
Our second approach makes no assumption about how price support affects the unobservable initial return distribution. Instead, we measure underpricing over horizons longer than a single day. Aggarwal (2000) states that most aftermarket short covering occurs within 10 to 15 days of the offering. In the study with the most detailed data on underwriter secondary market trading, Boehmer and Fishe (2002) report that the lead underwriter does not trade to support a certain price level after the first two days. If underwriter trading does affect the shape of the empirical initial return distribution, presumably this effect fades as investment bankers withdraw price support. A caveat, however, is that measuring underpricing over horizons longer than one day introduces noise, making it more difficult to identify relations in the cross section.
The results indicate that dual class IPOs are underpriced less severely than single class IPOs. The underpricing gap emerges in ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions of first-day and longer horizon returns as well as in tobit regressions, and it ranges from approximately 3 to 7%. We also estimate mixed distribution regressions and find that the underpricing gap exists for nonstabilized IPOs, but not for stabilized IPOs.
After Section 2 describes the data, Section 3 reports cross-sectional underpricing regressions; the OLS estimates are generally robust to alternative measures of firm size. With regard to dual class shares, dual class IPOs experience less underpricing whether we use the IPO offer value, sales, total assets, or the firm's post-IPO market capitalization to proxy for size. Section 4 discusses censored regressions as well as regressions that use horizons longer than one day to measure IPO underpricing. These regressions produce estimates that are not conditional on price support. We find results broadly comparable to the OLS regressions. The censored models suggest that dual class firms experience around three percentage points less underpricing compared to single class IPOs. Furthermore, other parameter estimates are very similar in sign and significance between the censored and OLS regressions. Regressions on longer horizon underpricing measures generate less precise parameter estimates, so several relations that are significant in OLS and censored regressions are insignificant in longer horizon regressions. Still, we find robust evidence that dual class shares are underpriced less severely than are single class shares. We conclude Section 4 by presenting estimates from mixed distribution regressions.
Data
Our sample matches that in Smart and Zutter (2003) . 3 The data come from the Disclosure New Issues database. The IPO sample begins in January 1990 and ends in September 1998, and it includes 2,622 offerings, 253 of which are dual class IPOs. Table 1 reports means for the right-hand-side variables used throughout the paper. The average first-day return is 13.5%. The mean underpricing for duals and singles is 11.9% and 13.7%, respectively. Table 1 also reports mean values for various measures of firm size, all of which are present to some extent in the underpricing literature. Although there is considerable variation in the nominal values for size proxies, we find that the four measures are significantly positively correlated. We address the choice of size proxy in the next section. Table 1 reveals that duals differ from singles along several dimensions that can influence underpricing. Relative to singles, duals are larger in size (all measures), they list a greater number of uses of proceeds and they use higher quality underwriters. Consistent with the differences in governance, singles are less likely to issue exclusively primary shares and duals are less likely to receive venture backing. Duals are more likely than singles to go public as equity carve-outs, they are less likely to list on Nasdaq and they are more likely to anticipate paying dividends after the IPO. The variables in Table 1 come from the existing underpricing literature. In the following analysis we control for these firm and deal characteristics by including their measures as right-hand-side controls.
Underpricing and firm size
Many theoretical explanations for underpricing rely on the assumption of asymmetric information between market participants such as investment bankers, issuing firms and investors. Papers that study the factors determining the cross-sectional variance in IPO returns generally include a firm-size measure as a control variable. If more severe information asymmetries occur in smaller firms, then underpricing and size should be inversely related. We examine 25 underpricing papers published in top finance journals since 1999 and find that the literature uses multiple size measures, with the logarithm of IPO proceeds being the most common by a wide margin.
Each size proxy has its shortcomings. The offer proceeds depend on both firm size and the ownership percentage that insiders sell in the IPO. Total assets and sales are accounting-based size measures, and the underlying relation between a firm's assets or sales and its total market value can vary widely across industries. A fourth size measure, market capitalization, is directly affected by underpricing; Table 1 Sample characteristics by offer type Initial return is from the final offer price to the first-day secondary-market closing price. Offer value is the total number of shares offered times the CPI-adjusted final offer price. Net sales and total assets for the period preceding the offering are CPI-adjusted. Market capitalization is the total number of shares outstanding after the offering (as reported in the prospectus) times the CPI-adjusted midpoint of the filing price range. Offer-price revision equals the change in price from the midpoint of the high and low office prices to the final offer price. Positive offer price revision is equal to offer price revision for nonnegative values and zero otherwise. Number of uses of proceeds equals the number of use of proceeds listed in the final prospectus. Carter-Manaster rankings are taken from the list available on Jay Ritter's web site. Share overhang is equal to the number of shares retained divided by the number of shares issued. Lagged average underpricing is the average IPO underpricing for the month before the offer month. Lagged number of IPOs is the log of 1 plus the number of IPOs for the month before the offer month. Lagged market return is the compounded daily CRSP value-weighted percent return over the 22 trading days before the offer date. Indicator variables equal one, respectively, for integer-priced deals, primary shares only deals, venturebacked deals, equity carve-out deals, reverse LBO deals, Nasdaq-listed deals, first-tier audited deals, deals with antitakeover provisions and deals with no anticipated dividends. holding offer price and total shares constant, more underpricing leads to a higher market capitalization. As an ex ante measure of information asymmetries, market capitalization suffers from the additional problem that market participants cannot observe it until after the IPO. We do not take a stand on which size variable best captures cross-sectional variation in asymmetric information. Instead, we estimate several OLS regressions to determine whether the choice of size measure influences parameter estimates of underpricing determinants. The first four regressions in Table 2 indicate that dual class IPOs are underpriced approximately three percentage points less than single class deals, and that neither the magnitude nor the statistical significance of the results depends on the firm-size measure included in the regression. 4 In fact, we obtain the most conservative estimate of the gap between dual and single class underpricing when we use the offer proceeds to capture size. Regression models in Table 2 also include many control variables drawn from the existing literature. The variables include offer price revisions, the number of uses for the IPO proceeds listed in the prospectus, Carter and Manaster (1990) underwriting rankings as updated by Jay Ritter, share overhang (shares issued divided by shares retained), lagged underpricing, lagged IPO volume, lagged market returns and dummy variables for IPOs with integer prices, involving only primary shares, venture-backed IPOs, equity carveouts, reverse leveraged buyouts (LBOs), Nasdaq listings, IPOs audited by top-tier auditors, IPOs with antitakeover provisions and IPOs that indicate that they will not pay dividends.
Of the 17 other parameter estimates for Models 1-4 in Table 2 , very few show significant movement as the size proxy changes. For example, all four models indicate that significantly higher underpricing is associated with positive offer price revisions, greater share overhang, higher market returns, offer prices set on integers and venture-backed IPOs. All four models also agree that underpricing is lower for firms audited by top-tier auditors. When the models disagree as to the significance of a particular underpricing relation, the coefficient estimates are typically of similar magnitudes.
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In Models 5-7 we include an interaction term between the dual class dummy and sales. These specifications allow the relation between underpricing and firm size to vary between singles and duals. Brennan and Franks (1997) provide the theoretical basis for the prediction that dual class firms exhibit less underpricing than singles, but their logic does not imply a differential underpricing effect tied to firm size. Table 2 OLS regressions of initial returns on potential determinants including alternative size proxies The dependent variable is the initial public offering (IPO) initial return from the final offer price to the first-day secondary-market closing price. Dual class (offer type) deal equals one for dual class IPOs. Offer value is the total number of shares offered times the CPI-adjusted final offer price. Net sales and total assets for the period before the offering are CPI-adjusted. Market capitalization is the total number of shares outstanding after the offering (reported in the prospectus) times the CPI-adjusted midpoint of the filing price range. Offer-price revision equals the change in price from the midpoint of the high and low office prices to the final offer price. Positive offer price revision is equal to offer price revision for nonnegative values and zero otherwise. Number of uses of proceeds comes from the final prospectus. Carter-Manaster rankings come from Jay Ritter's web site. Share overhang is equal to the number of shares retained divided by shares issued. Lagged average underpricing is the average IPO underpricing for the month before the offer. Lagged number of IPOs is the log of one plus the number of IPOs in the month before the offer. Lagged market return is the compounded daily CRSP value-weighted percent return over the 22 trading days before the offer date. Indicator variables equal one, respectively, for integer-priced deals, primary shares only deals, venture-backed deals, equity carve-out deals, reverse LBO deals, Nasdaq-listed deals, first-tier audited deals, deals with antitakeover provisions and deals with no anticipated dividends. Regressions include SIC and year dummies. Arugaslan, Cook, and Kieschnick (2004) include an interaction term, so we do the same here. In Models 5 and 6 the results continue to indicate lower underpricing for duals, and to an even greater degree. Only in Model 7, which includes two size proxies and two highly correlated (ρ = 0.96) size interaction terms, does the statistical significance of the dual class effect disappear. Therefore, we conclude that offer proceeds, sales and total assets are all reasonable choices as measures of firm size and that most OLS parameter estimates are not sensitive to this choice. Of the four regressions, the one using sales does produce the highest adjusted R 2 value, so henceforth we use sales as our size measure. However, our results generally go through regardless of the size proxy used. Next, we turn to the problem of estimating underpricing determinants in the presence of underwriter price stabilization activity.
Inference in the presence of stabilization
As noted earlier, Figure 1 indicates an unusual concentration of observations at zero. About 400 firms, or 15% of the sample, have a zero initial return. Nearly 500 deals, or about 19%, realize an initial return greater than zero but not greater than 5%. Furthermore, slightly less than 9% of sample IPOs experience negative returns. It seems likely that these characteristics of the empirical distribution occur because underwriters provide price support for some IPOs. One way to "fit" the empirical distribution more precisely is to estimate a mixed distribution model. Asquith, Jones, and Kieschnick (1998) propose that underpricing studies should estimate a likelihood function using a density having the form:
where N 1 and N 2 refer to normal distributions having different means and variances as shown in Figure 2 . Estimating this function using a sample of first-day returns inevitably produces estimates such that:
Asquith, Jones, and Kieschnick (1998) label the distribution with a lower mean and variance as the distribution of stabilized IPOs, while the other distribution describes nonstabilized deals. They report their estimates of the means and variances of each distribution as follows:
One difficulty with using the mixed distribution approach is that it is impossible to say ex ante whether the initial return distribution is best described by a mixture of two normal distributions, more than two normal distributions, or a mixture of other
Mixture of two univariate normal densities
The first graph depicts two univariate normal densities; the second graph depicts a mixture of the two. types of distributions. One can test the ability of alternative likelihood functions to fit the data using likelihood ratio tests, such as the Akaike information criterion, but typically there is little theory to guide researchers in their choices for the underlying distributions in a mixed distribution framework.
A second concern, which in our view dominates the technical issues above, is that the coefficients obtained from the mixed approach can be interpreted as estimates of underlying population parameters only if we assume that the observed returns that map into the "stabilized" distribution are not themselves contaminated by stabilization. Otherwise, the estimates must be interpreted as being conditional on price stabilization. For example, noting that the coefficient on a price uncertainty variable is positive and significant for unsupported IPOs and negative and insignificant for supported issues, Asquith, Jones, and Kieschnick (1998) speculate that "What these results might suggest is that there is less ex ante price uncertainty for the price-supported IPOs. . ." Recall that in their paper the mean and standard deviation of the IPOs identified as stabilized by the mixture approach are 1.4% and 2.4%, respectively. Does the near-zero cross-sectional variance imply that underwriters can price these deals with great precision, or is the standard deviation low because underwriters affect the observed first-day return distribution by providing price support? Ex ante price uncertainty might appear to be unrelated to underpricing of stabilized IPOs because price support hides underwriters' pricing errors. Figure 3 shows the first-day return distributions for both dual and single class IPOs. Both distributions have an unusually large number of observations at zero, and both contain more small-positive than small-negative observations. The dual class distribution's shape is less smooth because there are far fewer IPOs represented in that part of the figure. However, the figure hints that price stabilization influences both distributions.
We provide new estimates of the underpricing difference between singles and duals using methods that explicitly account for stabilization's effects. First, we estimate several censored models that assume that IPOs are drawn from a single distribution, but price support obscures parts of the distribution. Both Ruud (1993) and Hansen (2001) estimate parameters of the initial return distribution using tobit regressions. The first regression in Table 3 is a tobit that assumes price support activities leftcensor the empirical initial return distribution at zero. The second tobit regression places the left censoring cutoff at 5%. Though Aggarwal (2000) reports a strong negative relation between stabilizing trades and first-day returns, she also finds that underwriters provide some price support even for IPOs that begin trading slightly above the offer price. Therefore, we vary the censoring point to determine whether our results are sensitive to this choice.
A potential bias associated with the tobit approach is that it assumes all observations in a specified tail are censored. Aggarwal's (2000) evidence indicates that price support is not always present when initial returns are nonpositive, nor is it always 
Histograms of first-day returns for dual and single class IPOs from 1990 to 1998
Table 3
Censored regressions of initial returns for alternative censor points and intervals
The dependent variable is the IPO initial return from the final offer price to the first-day secondary-market closing price. Dual class (offer type) deal equals one for dual class IPOs. Net sales for the period before the offering is CPI-adjusted. Offer-price revision equals the change in price from the midpoint of the high and low office prices to the final offer price. Positive offer price revision is equal to offer price revision for nonnegative values and zero otherwise. Number of uses of proceeds comes from the final prospectus. Carter-Manaster rankings come from Jay Ritter's web site. Share overhang is equal to the number of shares retained divided by shares issued. Lagged average underpricing is the average IPO underpricing for the month before the offer. Lagged number of IPOs is the log of 1 plus the number of IPOs for the month before the offer. Lagged market return is the compounded daily CRSP value-weighted percent return over the 22 trading days before the offer date. Indicator variables equal one, respectively, for integer-priced deals, primary shares only deals, venture-backed deals, equity carve-out deals, reverse LBO deals, Nasdaq-listed deals, first-tier audited deals, deals with antitakeover provisions and deals with no anticipated dividends. Regressions include SIC and year dummies. Pseudo R 2 is the R 2 between the predicted and observed values.
Censored normal regression Tobit regression Model 4 Model 5 Model 1
Model 2 Model 3 −1% < = Cen. −1% < = Cen. Cen. < = 0 Cen. < = 5% Cen. = 0 < = 1% < = 5% absent when initial returns are positive. Rather, the evidence indicates that underwriters are more likely to engage in price stabilization when IPOs' initial returns are close to zero. Therefore, in addition to estimating conventional tobit models with a single censoring point, we also estimate interval censored regressions in Models 3-5. Table 3 indicates that after accounting for either point or interval censoring, dual class firms underprice less than single class firms. The dual class point estimates range from −2.5% to −3.7% and are significant for all specifications except for Model 5. The sign and significance of parameter estimates in Table 3 match the results in Table 2 relatively well. In the vast majority of cases, if OLS results point to a positive or negative significant relation between a certain variable and underpricing, so do the censored regression models. Similarly, the models tend to agree on the righthand side variables that are not related to underpricing. We also replicate (but do not include in Table 3 ) our Table 2 specification that includes two firm size measures and their interactions with the dual class dummy. As in Table 2 , including both size measures and their (highly correlated) interactions results in an insignificant dual class coefficient.
An alternative method to using censored regressions to account for the stabilization of first-day returns is to examine returns over a longer horizon. Both Ruud (1993) and Aggarwal (2000) adopt this approach. Ruud (1993) demonstrates that the distribution of IPO returns approaches a normal curve as time elapses. She rejects the hypothesis that the empirical distribution of IPO returns is normal at one, two and three weeks, but she fails to reject it at four weeks. The results imply that over time the left tail of the return distribution, which is unobservable initially due to price support, gradually reemerges. Whether price stabilization exerts a purely temporary effect on prices remains an open question. In the large sample studies of Ruud (1993) and Hanley, Kumar, and Seguin (1993) , which use 810 and 1,523 IPOs, respectively, the effects appear to be temporary, while more recent but small-sample work by Aggarwal (2000) and Schultz and Zaman (1994) conclude that stabilization has a permanent effect on prices.
6 Figure 4 shows a histogram of market-adjusted returns measured over the first 44 days of trading. Graphing the 44-day returns results in a histogram that is much more bell-shaped than is the first-day return distribution. As expected, this distribution has much less mass at zero and a much higher incidence of negative returns than the distribution of one-day returns. Table 4 shows results for the primary regression specification with dependent variables that are long-horizon initial returns adjusted for market movements measured over several different holding periods. One caveat with this approach, however, is that as the holding period lengthens the noise in the return distribution increases and the regression R 2 falls. Nevertheless, the estimates show that dual class firms experience between 5.4 and 7.4 percentage points lower underpricing than do single class IPOs.
Many of the results in Table 4 match those from OLS and censored regressions. All three methods provide at least some evidence of higher underpricing when offer-price revisions occur, when high-reputation underwriters are used, when share overhang is greater, when fewer firms have gone public recently, when the offer price is an integer and when the firm is venture backed. In a few cases, Table 4 's estimates conflict with earlier results. For example, the coefficients on lagged market returns are negative and significant in Table 4 , whereas they are positive and significant in earlier models. This might reflect very "hot" IPOs experiencing some short-term price reversals after a substantial initial runup. 7 To what extent do these results hold up when we control for price stabilization's effects by estimating a mixed distribution model? To answer this question, we 7 Once again, we estimate regressions on 44-day returns with two firm size measures and their interactions with the dual class dummy, and as in all previous cases, this specification results in an insignificant dual class coefficient. Given that we obtain a negative and significant dual class coefficient in all other models, we conclude that the simultaneous inclusion of two size measures and two interaction terms introduces multicollinearity problems. 
OLS regressions of market-adjusted initial returns for various holding periods
The dependent variable is the market-adjusted IPO initial return from the final offer price to the eleventhday, twenty-second-day, thirty-third-day, or forty-fourth-day secondary-market closing prices less the corresponding CRSP value-weighted return. Dual class (offer type) deal equals one for dual class IPOs. Net sales for the period before the offering is CPI-adjusted. Offer-price revision equals the change in price from the midpoint of the high and low office prices to the final offer price. Positive offer price revision is equal to offer price revision for nonnegative values and zero otherwise. Number of uses of proceeds comes from the final prospectus. Carter-Manaster rankings come from Jay Ritter's web site. Share overhang is equal to the number of shares retained divided by the number of shares issued. Lagged average underpricing is the average IPO underpricing for the month before the offer month. Lagged number of IPOs is the log of one plus the number of IPOs for the month before the offer month. Lagged market return is the compounded daily CRSP value-weighted percent return over the 22 trading days before the offer date. Indicator variables equal one, respectively, for integer-priced deals, primary shares only deals, venture-backed deals, equity carve-out deals, reverse LBO deals, Nasdaq-listed deals, first-tier audited deals, deals with antitakeover provisions and deals with no anticipated dividends. Regressions include SIC and year dummies. estimate several mixed distribution models with likelihood functions having the form of Equation (1). 8 In Table 5 , our maximum likelihood specification takes the same form as in Arugaslan, Cook, and Kieschnick (2004) , and we use their OLS estimates Arugaslan, Cook, and Kieschnick (2004, Table 6 ) specification. The dependent variable is the IPO initial return, the change in price from the final offer price to the first-day secondary-market closing price. Net sales for the period preceding the offering is CPI-adjusted. Offer-price revision equals the change in price from the midpoint of the high and low office prices to the final offer price. Reverse LBO deal equals one for previous LBO firms. Dual class (offer type) deal equals one for dual class IPOs. Regressions include industry dummy variables for Arugaslan, Cook, and Kieschnick (2004, as starting values. This extremely parsimonious specification includes the dual class dummy, the natural logarithm of sales (and its interaction with the dual dummy), an offer price revision variable (linear effect only) and a dummy for reverse LBOs. In Panel A, the model estimates the parameter p, the proportion of stabilized IPOs, as 83.6%. According to our estimates, the vast majority of IPOs falls into the stabilized group and has a cross-sectional underpricing standard deviation of just 8.1%. Again we emphasize that this standard deviation, as well as the other parameter estimates, should be interpreted as being conditional on price support rather than reflecting the distribution that would have obtained in the absence of stabilization. For the group of stabilized IPOs, only the offer price revision variable and the dummy for reverse LBOs are significant. The dual class coefficient indicates roughly two percentage points lower underpricing for duals, but the estimate is not significant. For the relatively small number of nonstabilized IPOs, the cross-sectional standard deviation is almost 29%, and the dual class estimate is highly significant. However, the underpricing gap of about 34 percentage points seems implausibly high to us.
The relative mix of stabilized and nonstabilized IPOs identified by our likelihood function is at odds with findings in Asquith, Jones, and Kieschnick (1998) and Aggarwal (2000) , both of which report a much more even split between the two groups. In the second set of regressions in Table 5 , we constrain the weighting parameter, p, to equal 50% to see how that decision affects the estimates. As in the previous mixed regressions, the dual class coefficient is negative, but again it is significant only for nonstabilized deals. Although still unbelievably large, the magnitude of the dual class estimate for the nonstabilized deals falls by about half relative to the prior estimate in Table 5 . Experimenting with additional specifications we find that if we constrain the weighting parameter and force even more observations into the nonstabilized category, the dual class coefficient eventually becomes insignificant for both stabilized and nonstabilized transactions. In Table 6 we estimate mixture regressions using a more complete specification that controls for numerous additional effects that our earlier models include. In Table 6 we do not constrain the weighting parameter, and we use OLS estimates from Table 2 as starting values in the maximum likelihood estimation. We report two specifications in Table 6 , one with and one without the interaction between firm sales and the dual class dummy. Once again our estimates point to a very high fraction of deals (roughly 80%) receiving price support. For those IPOs, we find no significant difference between dual and single class underpricing, but we do find a significant (and to us, implausibly large) difference for the nonstabilized deals. Across all specifications, only two variables are consistently significant for both stabilized and nonstabilized deals: the positive offer price revision variable and our share overhang measure. Most of the other controls are insignificant across all specifications (e.g., underwriter reputation, lagged market returns and venture backing) or are significant for either the stabilized or nonstabilized group, but not both.
Is it possible that 80% or more of the IPOs in our sample receive price support from underwriters? We cannot rule out that possibility, but we can point to evidence in the literature suggesting that our estimate of the proportion of stabilized deals is too high. From SEC documents containing transaction-by-transaction data on stabilization trades in 1997, Aggarwal (2000) finds that just over half the IPOs in the sample receive any form of price support. Similarly, estimating the proportion of stabilized deals over a sample from 1982 -1983 , Asquith, Jones, and Kieschnick (1998 also report that roughly half of all IPOs fall into the stabilized group. If we use this finding from prior research as a way to constrain the proportion of stabilized deals ex ante, as we do in Table 5 , the dual class coefficient remains negative and significant for the nonstabilized group, but the magnitude of the coefficient drops dramatically. The Table 6 Mixture of two normal regressions of initial returns with Table 2 specification The dependent variable is the IPO initial return from the final offer price to the first-day secondary-market closing price. Dual class (offer type) deal equals one for dual class IPOs. Net sales for the period before the offering is CPI-adjusted. Offer-price revision equals the change in price from the midpoint of the high and low office prices to the final offer price. Positive offer price revision is equal to offer price revision for nonnegative values and zero otherwise. Number of uses of proceeds comes from the final prospectus. Carter-Manaster rankings come from Jay Ritter's web site. Share overhang is equal to the number of shares retained divided by the number of shares issued. Lagged average underpricing is the average IPO underpricing for the month before the offer month. Lagged number of IPOs is the log of one plus the number of IPOs for the month before the offer month. Lagged market return is the compounded daily CRSP value-weighted percent return over the 22 trading days before the offer date. Indicator variables are set equal one, respectively, for integer-priced deals, primary shares only deals, venture-backed deals, equity carve-out deals, reverse LBO deals, Nasdaq-listed deals, first-tier audited deals, deals with antitakeover provisions and deals with no anticipated dividends. Regressions include SIC and year dummies. sensitivity of parameter estimates to changes in the weighting of stabilized deals is not a phenomenon that affects only the dual class variable. From the tests reported in this section, we conclude that Smart and Zutter's (2003) original finding of lower initial returns for dual class firms is not a spurious artifact of stabilization. Accounting for price support by estimating censored models or by examining returns over longer horizons leads to a comparable or larger underpricing gap than originally reported. Even in the mixed regression framework, dual class firms in the nonstabilized category exhibit lower underpricing. However, the estimate of the proportion of stabilized deals, the magnitude of the dual class coefficient and the sensitivity of results to the weight placed on stabilized deals all suggest caution regarding the reliability of the estimates obtained from the mixed regression approach.
Conclusions
Advocates for the mixed distribution approach challenge established underpricing results on the grounds that estimates obtained from conventional cross-sectional regressions do not properly capture heterogeneity in the data generating process. If in fact the mixed distribution approach provides a theoretically superior method for analyzing the cross section of IPO returns and if results from this model differ from those obtained through conventional cross-sectional regressions, then any established IPO underpricing cross-sectional relation can be questioned.
In this paper, we focus on the underpricing differences between dual and single class IPOs to see how widely estimates from alternative methods and specifications vary. In general, we find that several alternative estimation approaches all point toward less underpricing for duals. While we agree that the empirical distribution of firstday returns is nonnormal, we argue that the mixed distribution model confuses the empirical return distribution with the unobservable underlying distribution of primary interest to researchers. If underwriters do in fact regularly provide price support, which is our belief, then their activities can affect the return distribution. In this case, researchers can either attempt to estimate cross-sectional relations conditional on price support having occurred, or they can use techniques that attempt to account for the effects of stabilization and thereby produce estimates of cross-sectional underpricing determinants that are not conditional on price support.
We argue that researchers have available to them at least two methods for obtaining estimates when observed returns do not reflect the true underlying distribution of initial returns due to price stabilization. The first method assumes that although we can observe an initial return for every IPO, for some deals the observable return does not reflect the true return. In this case we argue that a censored regression fits the true distribution of initial returns better than a mixed regression approach. Alternatively, rather than making an assumption about how price support affects the true distribution, one can measure underpricing over horizons longer than a single day. This implies that over time the left tail of the underlying return distribution, which is unobservable initially due to price support, gradually reemerges. Results from censored regression models and from conventional regressions that measure underpricing over horizons longer than one day produce broadly similar results, and both methods indicate lower underpricing for dual class IPOs.
